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REPLY POINTS 
Appellant, by and through his attorney of record, hereby 
replies to the Brief of Respondent, the State of Utah, as follows: 
1. APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS OF THE 
DEFENDANT. 
A. STATEMENTS OF THE DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED 
AS THEY WERE THE RESULT OF AN UNLAWFUL ARREST. 
Appellee argues that the trial court's findings and 
determination that the arrest and detention of the Appellant on a 
parole warrant were justified because the parole hold was 
authorized by statute and was therefor a valid arrest. Appellant's 
position on this point is that the underlying purpose and reasons 
given by parole agent John Graf justifying the detention of the 
Appellant had been satisfied when Appellant and his parole officer, 
1 
Mr. Mont Court, had a conversation at which time Court advised the 
Appellant that he could remain in the Cedar City area until 
November 28, 1989, to find work and a residence. Mr. Court 
testified at the suppression hearing on October 16, 1989, that he 
had so advised the Appellant. (T. 10/16/89 p.80) Although after 
discussing the matter with Mr. Graf, Mr. Court changed his mind on 
the issue of the Appellant remaining in the Cedar City area, that 
position was never communicated to the Appellant, who checked in 
with the local office as required. Mr. Graf testified at the same 
hearing that the basis of the arrest of the Appellant was that he 
felt it was inappropriate that he remain in Cedar City and that 
they intended to arrest Appellant and then give him that 
information. (T.10/16/89 p.51). 
Appellant submits that it is improper to use as the basis for 
arrest and detention of Appellant the matters which Appellant had 
been informed by his parole officer to have been resolved. 
Appellant does not agree with the Appellee's position that the 
provisions of §77-27-11(2) allow such an arrest. See Payton v. New 
York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 SCt. 1371, 63 LEd2d 639 (1980), which holds 
that absent exigent circumstances, an arrest warrant is required 
before a suspect can be arrested in his home. In the present case, 
the arrest of the Appellant was made in the early hours of the 
morning, without warrant, and effectuated at the home of the 
Appellant. There is no question that the real reason the Appellant 
was arrested was because of the suspected commission of homicide. 
If, as asserted, that was the reason for the arrest of Appellant, 
2 
the law enforcement officers should have obtained a warrant for the 
arrest of the Appellant from a magistrate. 
Appell ai 1 1: submil -J thai I hie n i i-i-l W I I iiipi opei MI II ill 1 
evidence obtained as a result thereof, including statements made by 
Appellant while in custody, should have been suppressed. 
fclFENDANT * U STATUMKNTIS WIIKRK T A K K N IN V I O L A T I O N OP MIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
Af ipp Ih'i' «. t ,| t pc. ,,.., (, , r t 11 in ] f s pos 11 ion t h a t t h e A p p e l l a n t 
voluntarily and knowingly waived his rights under the Miranda 
doctrine, that "Hi s statement was confusing at; first because 
<*• ' - ;:i fi: oiiri deta i ] tc cieta ii ] ai id in 1 xnd up I he events 
Defendant was crying par t • i , \.,:(e however , ,*;*:• coherent -. u; 
settled down during the interview. \ppellee did not cite <r * ^  
recoi: c:i to s u p p o I l ., • 
the position that the Appellant was o: tr. appropriate state ct : , KI 
to knowingly waive the right not to have counsel present auj.-i.ng 
questioning or the ri ght not to give evidence against hi mself. It 
is clear that at the point when he was advised of those rights, is 
the poi nt a t: wh i ch lie wan most con I" USCM I . not until 30 
minutes into the interview that the Appellant appeared to settle 
down and relate events with more rational effort Appellant agrees 
with the argument, ol: t.fp-» Arn »^  ' 1 ei:" that "e 1 f idence thai d e f e n d a n t was 
upset" I s not sufficient f - support a finding that the trial court 
erred admitting the statement However, evidence that the 
Appc . upset , together with ev jdeiu.v I lial ln> ! "fell lit h in; 
going crazy," tha t he was "tripping out," and that he */as 
3 
"confused" at the time when he waived Miranda rights is sufficient 
to establish such error. 
Further, although the Appellee referred to the requirem^ "*-** ^ 
Edwards v. Arizona. 451 U.S. 477 (1981), Appellee did not address 
the failure of the trial court to consider the requirement set 
forth in Edwards for the trial court to focus on the issue of 
"waiver" once the right has been previously asserted. The failure 
of the trial court to make any findings on that issue requires 
either suppression based upon this Court's review of the record or 
a remand to the lower court for reconsideration of that issue and 
specific findings as to the basis for decision. See State v. 
Strain. ~?l°l P.2d 22/ . 
2. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED PROSPECTIVE JUROR 
MARVA PEAY FOR CAUSE. 
Appellee argues that the action of the trial court in 
dismissing prospective juror Marva Peay for cause was appropriate 
based upon her mental condition. However, Appellant submits that 
there is not sufficient basis in the record to support that 
argument and the action of the trial court in dismissing the juror 
upon that basis. 
At the time the prospective jurors were brought before the 
court, the court assembled them together and put to the jurors the 
preliminary questions required by Rule 18 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure which included an inquiry as to whether any of 
the jurors was suffering from any physical or mental disability 
which would prevent them from serving on the panel. (Tr. at 6) 
4 
Prospective juror Peay did not indicate any problem which would 
constitute a disabl - - ^mstance p r e v e n t i n g her from serving on 
the jury. One prospective juror reported a hearing problem which 
would present a problem ini *\as excused The court then inquired 
.i;;* tin w h e t l u 1 ! t\\ m i l in <1 .11 " s i M ' i r i u s pr OIJ 1 em, " t n */11 i <" 11 
there was no response. The court then made a specific finding that 
"there were -* disabling circumstances J that the panel was 
ifv-* dur i nq ai ice 
- * - :; ter' -. ; discharge rht duties i * juror." (Tr. 8-9) The 
panel was then seated and the court further instructed them 
concern.! ng the juror quest] onnaire tin a' hose qua] i f i ecil to si t 
would be completing. In explanatio *\e court indicated that the 
purpose of the questionnaire was : » provide additional information 
so as to afford the parties the basis +* determine whether +*hp 
jurors could be fair and impartial in K U,G ;? 
:i : 
theii oackground or opinions which may form the basis for a 
challenge under Rule 18 (10) or (14) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure 
The only basis state for the motion to dismiss for cause by 
the prosecution was the "inability " to vote for the death penalty. 
(f : ip.rp was no reference to ment-al state or difficulties 
; rasis : r rhe challenge r fa ne record of examination 
o i c u e M r , : - • . :•<-•- u c n I M I I I t i me 
sittinn udgment but would be willing t . ;,. s^ and would be 
willing to impose the death penalty if she felt it appropriate. 
5 
(Tr. 857-855). 
In response to the specific questions concerning the effect of 
her health on her ability to serve, the juror did not indicate that 
the condition would be debilitating. When asked if her reluctance 
to serve was based upon health reasons, she indicated that her 
opposition to serving was related to her job, not health reasons. 
(Tr. 838). When asked whether the fact she had been summoned to 
jury duty had any effect upon inducing any depression, she stated 
"No.11 (Tr. 839). When asked by the court whether she could follow 
the instructions of the court, she indicated she could, and further 
indicated that she had served on a jury previously and had rendered 
a "just" result. (Tr. 851). 
The court did not find that the juror was presently suffering 
from any condition which would justify a challenge for cause, but 
that there was a possibility that she could become depressed and 
her deliberations would be affected. (Tr. 855). 
Appellee argues that the Appellant has no right to "compel 
service of the particular juror who was excused, nor the right to 
force the prosecution to exercise a peremptory challenge to exclude 
her." Appellant submits that, in fact, he has such a right under 
the rulings of the Supreme Court of the United States in Gray v. 
Mississippi, 481 US 648. 
3. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY REFUSING TO GRANT 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL. 
The Appellee incorrectly states the holding of Walker v. 
State. 624 P.2d 687 (Utah 1981) to require that the Appellant must 
6 
prove that the prosecution presented evidence that was false, that 
t ' * - - * . • * - * . . , 
a reasonable • . . ^ , > 3 judgment could L-t affected 
by * e false testimony. Walker prohibits the creatior false 
i -
well be j*. I ' * witness Luce -it * ^ : i, ^ * * - nay 
have believed she observed i scabbard strappec ^
 4- < * the 
However, . i ' the fact I;M*~ neither M s . Luce : r v: Robbins, 
both of whom related seeing the Appellant witn u;e scabbard 
strapped to hi s 1 ea in an out of court i ntervip.w. i. in anv 
previous statements iv enforcement officers, ;r pre-
test imonial interviews pi:i or t: < ::> pre] I in I nary hea "K; I *< * ner 
of their testimonies at preliminary hearing, ever mentioned seeing 
a weapon, said evidence is suspect. The presence of a knife on the 
persoi 1 :)f Appe3 li ttedly c< ' • t: :) til: le State 1 3 theory 
of the case a evidence whic^ * * e State had obtained 
indicating the weapon used '- administer the cuts to the victim's 
net I' was a IMITIITHHI kitchen i roni a set which had been in the 
apartment where the Appellant and Defendant Lance Wood had resided. 
In Walker, < i t 62 1 I 2 1 6S 1 the court i ndicated that the 
proseciit i on " • r. e] i ai i : •€ I Lp< : u i a fa] se impression created by 
inaccurate testimony would represent a corruption o f the truth 
seeking process. The court: stated: 
The false impression which the prosecution knowing 
fostered in the present case constitutes prosecutorial 
misconduct which seriously interfered with the trial 
court's truth-seeking function. We believe this to be 
7 
analogous to the prosecution's knowing use of false 
testimony and therefore subject to the same standard of 
materiality used in those cases. 
In the present case, the actions of the prosecution fall within the 
proscription of the standard set forth above. As to the third 
element of affect upon the jury determination, the trial court made 
a specific finding that the evidence of possession of a knife by 
Appellant would affect the outcome of the jury's consideration of 
the matter and that it was of great concern in this particular case 
where the jury would also be considering penalty. (Tr. 1887-1888) 
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant submits the only 
reasonable and fair remedy was the granting of the mistrial motion 
and to require Appellant to proceed before the jury which had heard 
the damning evidence was to violate his right to a fair and 
impartial hearing. 
4. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-3-207 WAS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY 
ENACTED AND ADOPTED. 
Appellee asserts that the Utah State Legislature and not the 
Utah Supreme Court possessed the power to regulate the courts of 
this state by enacting as law rules of criminal procedure and 
evidence prior to the enactment of the statute §76-3-207 providing 
for the procedure to be used in penalty phases of capital 
homicides. Appellee does not cite any constitutional provision or 
any case law to support that position. Appellee simply argues that 
since the Constitution of Utah was amended to include Article VIII 
Section 4, which specifically states that the Supreme Court shall 
possess such power, that the power to regulate proceedings in the 
8 
courts of this state did not exist in the Supreme Court prior to 
that time. Appellant submits that the power to govern the 
procedure of the courts of this state is and was inherent in the 
powers granted to the Supreme Court in Article VIII Section 1 prior 
to the amendment of Article VIII and is a basic principal of 
separation of powers. This Court has previously recognized that it 
has inherent power to regulate the practice of law in this state, 
even though no express power to do so is set forth in the 
Constitution. In IN RE UTAH STATE BAR PETITION FOR APPROVAL OF 
CHANGES IN DISCIPLINARY RULES ON ADVERTISING, 647 P. 2d 991, Justice 
Oaks referred to rule-making powers which were inherent in the 
judicial power granted by Article VIII Section 1 of the Utah 
Constitution. At 647 P.2d 992, he stated, "Inherent in that 
judicial power is the power to regulate the practice of law." 
Rule-making powers of the court have been considered to be an 
inherent part of the constitutionally vested judicial power where 
the constitutional provisions do not specifically set forth such 
powers. Such rule-making powers include the power to prescribe 
such rules of procedure or practice as may be necessary for the 
proper administration of justice. See 20 Am Jur 2d Courts Sections 
78, 79, and 82. See also Arizona Podiatry Ass'n v. Director of 
Insurance. 422 P. 2d 108, in which the Arizona Supreme Court 
determined that rule-making power was inherent in the courts, even 
though the Arizona Constitution did not specifically provide for 
such prior to a constitutional amendment. The Washington State 
Supreme Court also recognized the inherent powers of rule-making in 
9 
In Re Marriage of Hermansen. 617 P.2d 462. 
The Appellant submits that the effect of the amendment to the 
Utah State Constitution, Article VIII Section 4, did not result in 
a grant of new authority to make procedural rules in the Supreme 
Court, but provided limitation on those inherent powers by giving 
the legislature the power to override the procedural rules 
established by the Supreme Court if they could obtain the necessary 
two-thirds vote. 
In any event, Appellant argues that the legislature abdicated 
any authority which they may have had to enact procedural rules 
when Utah Code Annotated, §78-2-4, which provides as follows: 
Rules-making power. The Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah has power to prescribe, alter, and revise, by rules, 
for all courts of the State of Utah, the forms of 
process, writs, pleadings and motions and the practice 
and procedure in all civil and criminal actions and 
proceed! ?s, including rules of evidence therein, and 
also divorce, probate and guardianship proceedings. Such 
rules may not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive 
rights of any litigant. Upon promulgation the Supreme 
Court shall fix the date when such rules shall take 
effect and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith 
providing for procedure in courts only shall be of no 
further force and effect. Nothing in this title, any-
thing to therein to the contrary notwithstanding, shall 
in any way limit, supersede or repeal any such rules 
heretofore prescribed by the Supreme Court. 
The above cited statute, enacted by the legislature in 1951, was, 
with exception to the last sentence, identical to former §20-2-4.1, 
which was enacted by the legislature in 1943. The 1951 version was 
in effect in 1973 when the original version of §76-3-207 providing 
sentencing procedures to be employed in capital homicide matters. 
That statute, including the various amendments which have since 
occurred, contains provisions relating to procedural and 
10 
evidentiary matters which should be established by this Court. 
Appellant submits that the enactment of §76-3-207 was both 
constitutionally improper and was also in violation of the 
legislatures grant of authority to the Supreme Court in §78-2-4. 
Further, Appellant suggests that in the event the Court agrees 
that the initial enactment of §76-3-207 was improper, then the 
subsequent blanket adoption of statutory rules of procedure and 
evidence by this Court in 1985 is not valid since the Court cannot 
retroactively validate a statute invalid at its inception. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant submits that the Court should grant him the relief 
sought on appeal based upon the matters submitted herein and in the 
Brief of Appellant. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of July, 1992. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, four (4) 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to R. Paul Van Dam, Utah 
Attorney General, at 23 6 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
this 8th day of July, 1992. 
11 
ADDENDUM 
20 Am Jur 2d Courts Sections 78, 79, and 82 
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII Section 1 
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII Section 4 
Utah Code Annotated, §76-3-207 
Utah Code Annotated, §77-27-11(2) 
Utah Code Annotated, §78-2-4 
Utah Rules of criminal Procedure, Rule 18 (10) and (14) 
12 
20 Am Jur 2d COURTS §78 
an opinion of one of its members which unnecessarily contains such scandalous 
matter.11 
Where legislation provides for the appointment of a reporter by the Supreme 
Court of the state, it is generally his duty to prepare the official court report.12 
Courts of one state may take judicial notice of reports of decisions of courts 
of another state published under authority of such other state.13 Where there 
is a substantial variance between the presentation of a decision in an unofficial 
and an official report respectively, the court of a sister state will consider only 
the official report as informative of the decision actually rendered and will 
disregard the unofficial report.14 
§77. — Headnotes or syllabi. 
It has been pointed out that the preparation of headnotes is essentially not 
a judicial but a ministerial function, and that therefore the headnotes are 
ordinarily prepared by the court reporter.15 Proceeding upon this theory and 
upon the principle that it is unconstitutional for a statute to impose other than 
judicial duties upon judges, it has been held that a statute which imposes upon 
the Supreme Court of a state the duty to make a syllabus of each opinion 
rendered by it is unconstitutional and therefore invalid.16 
The composition of headnotes or syllabi is, however, sometimes the work of 
the court itself,17 and a court may, by rule of court, establish the principle that 
the syllabus constitutes the official opinion of the court and that matters outside 
the syllabus are not to be regarded as the decision.18 But even so, the rules 
stated in a court syllabus must be considered with reference to the facts of the 
case and to the questions presented to and considered by the court.19 
B. INHERENT POWERS 
§ 78. Generally. 
The statement that a court has certain "inherent" powers appears frequently 
in the reported opinions.20 Sometimes the references are made concerning 
11. Lucas v Central Missouri Trust Go. 
349 Mo 537, 162 SW2d 569. 
12. A court reporter is not duty bound, and 
cannot be compelled by mandamus, to furnish 
copies of the report of a case prior to the 
time it is ready for publication; until that 
time the opinion, as well as the statement of 
the case and the syllabus, ought to be open 
for any correction that may be necessary for 
the proper understanding of the case. Peck 
v Hooker, 61 Conn 413, 23 A 741. 
13. Bostrom v Jennings, 326 Mich 146, 40 
NW2d 97. 
14. Franklin v Trickey, 9 Ariz 282, 80 P 
352. 
15. Ex parte Griffiths, 118 Ind 83, 20 NE 
513. 
§ 65, supra. 
16. Ex parte Griffiths, supra. 
17. Denham v Holman, 26 Ga 182 (saying 
that it is not true that the reporter puts the 
headnotes to the cases); Ex parte Griffiths, 118 
Ind 83, 20 NE 513; Schupbach v Continental 
Oil Co. 193 Kan 401, 394 P2d 1. 
18. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v Baillie, 112 
Ohio St 567, 148 NE 233 (Supreme Court 
of Ohio). 
19. Laube v Prudential Ins. Co. 147 Ohio 
St 450, 72 NE2d 76, 2 ALR2d 936; Perry 
v Arsham, 101 Ohio App 285, 1 Ohio Ops 
2d 266, 136NE2d 141. 
Although, under the Ohio Supreme Court 
rule, the syllabus of a decision states the law 
of the case, it does not state the law for 
every somewhat similar case. New York 
Cent. R. Co. v Dclich (CA6 Ohio) 252 F2d 
522; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v Henery 
(CA6 Ohio) 235 F2d 770. 
20. Reid v Prentice-Hall, Inc. (CA6 Ohio) 
261 F2d 700: Ex parte United States (CA7 
Wis) 101 F2d 870, 131 ALR 176, affd with-
out op, United States v Stone, 308 US 519, 
84 L ed 441, 60 S Ct 177; Arc Invest. Co. v 
Tiffith, 164 Cal App 2d Supp 853, 330 P2d 
305; State v Brady, 156 Kan 831, 137 P2d 
206; State ex rel. Kennedy v District Court 
of Fifth Judicial Dist. 121 Mont 320, 194 
439 
§ 7 9 COURTS 2 0 A m J u r 2 d 
specific t\pes of courts, such as courts of record1 or courts of general jurisdiction.2 
The phrase "inherent powers" is used to refer to powers included within the 
scope of a court's jurisdiction3 which a court possesses irrespective of specific 
grant by constitution or legislation.4 Such powers can neither be taken away 
nor abiidged by the legislature.5 But the power a court possesses only by virtue 
of a statutory grant is not an inherent power.6 
The inherent powers of a court do not increase its jurisdiction; they are limited 
to such powers as are essential to the existence of the court and necessary to the 
orderly and efficient exercise of its jurisdiction.7 
Courts have inherent power to effectuate the functions and duties imposed 
upon them in criminal as well as in civil matters, although perhaps not to the 
same extent in criminal as in civil matters.8 
§ 79. Powers classified as inherent. 
Courts have inherent power to do all things that are reasonably necessary 
for the administration of justice within the scope of their jurisdiction.9 It has 
P2d 256, 2 ALR2d 1050; Patterson v Pollock, 
84 Ohio App 489, 39 Ohio Ops 2d 566, 
53 Ohio L Abs 307, 84 NE2d 606; Ham-
bright v Cleveland (Okla) 360 P2d 493; 
Leahey v Farrell, 362 Pa 52, 66 A2d 577; 
Shields v Romine, 122 W Va 639, 13 SE2d 16. 
1. State v Cannon, 244 NG 399, 94 S£2d 
339 (a court of record has the inherent power 
to make its records speak the truth; it has 
power to amend the record, correct mistakes 
of its clerk or other court officers, or remedy 
defects or supply omissions in record); Re 
Loevinger, 40 SD 450, 167 NW 726 (court 
of record has inherent power to make judg-
ment correspond with the real judgment 
intended); Merrill v District Court of Fifth 
Judicial Dist. 73 Wyo 58, 272 P2d 597. 
2. Hain v Newell, 223 Mich 20, 193 ISTW 
839; Timmerman v Timmerman, 163 Neb 
704, 81 NW2d 135, 65 ALR2d 1372; Re 
Mayne's Estate (Wyo) 345 P2d 790. 
3 . Re Gonsky's Estate, 79 ND 123, 55 NW 
2d 60; Merrill v District Court of Fifth 
Judicial Dist. 73 Wyo 53, 272 P2d* 597. 
The term "inherent power of the judiciary" 
means that power which is essential to the 
existence, dignity, and functions of the court 
from the very fact that it is a court. Re 
Nebraska State Bar Asso. 133 Neb 283, 275 
NW265 , 114 A L R 1 5 1 . 
4. Ex parte Peterson, 253 US 300, 64 I.
 e d 
919, 40 S Ct 543; Arc Invest. Go. v Tiffith, 
164 Cal App 2d Supp 853, 330 P2d 305; 
Mattfeld v Nester, 226 Minn 106, 32 NV/2d 
29f, 3 ALR2d 909; State ex ref. Gentry
 v 
Becker, 351 Mo 769, 174 SW2d 181; Hale 
v State, 55 Ohio St 210, 45 NE 199; Com. 
v Brownmiller, 141 Pa Super 107, 14 A2d 
907. 
Courts, since their powers are coequal with 
their duties, have inherent power to do every-
thing necessary to carry out the purposes 
of their creation. Knox County Council v 
State, 217 Ind 493, 29 NE2d 405, 130 ALR 
1427. 
5. Re Huff, 352 Mich 402, 91 NW2d 
613; State ex rel. Ricco v Biggs, 198 Or 413, 
255 P2d 1055, 38 ALR2d 720; Burttschell 
v Sheppard, 123 Tex 113, 69 SW2d 402. 
The power of a court to hold in contempt 
may not be restricted by the legislature. 
People ex rel. Rusch v White, 334 111 465, 166 
NE 100, 64 ALR 1006; State v Shumafcer, 
200 Ind 716, 164 NE 408, 63 ALR 218; Chi-
cago, B. & Q. R. Co. v Gildersleeve, 219 Mo 
170, 1 1 8 S W 8 6 . 
6. American Life Ins. Co. v Powell, 259 
Ala 70, 65 So 2d 516. 
Since the authority of a court to suspend 
sentences and to grant paroles is purely stat-
utory, it is not an inherent power. State v 
Boston, 234 Iowa 1047, 14 NW2d 676; Ful-
ler v State, 100 Miss 811, 57 So 806. 
7. Hopkins v Bamhardt, 223 NG 617, 27 
SE2d 644. 
A court has inherent powers to maintain 
its dignity as a court, to secure obedience 
to its process and rules, and to punish un-
seemly behavior. State ex rel. Mahoney v 
Superior Court, 78 Ariz 74, 275 P2d 887. 
8. State v Brady, 156 Kan 831, 137 P2d 
206. 
9. Brydonjack v State Bar, 208 Cal 439, 
281 P 1018, 66 ALR 1507; State ex rel. Coun-
ty Welfare Bd. v Starke Circuit Court, 238 
Ind 35, 147 NE2d 585; Wassung v Wassung, 
136 Neb 440, 286 NW 340; Hopkins v Bam-
hardt, 223 NC 617, 27 SE2d 644; Layman v 
State (Okla Crim) 355 P2d 444; School Dist 
of Irwin v School Dist. of North Huntingdon 
Twp. 374 Pa 134, 97 A2d 96. 
Every court of justice, so long as it retains 
control of the subject matter and of the 
parties, has the inherent power to correct 
that which has been wrongfully done by vir-
tue of its process. United States v Morgan, 
307 US 183, 83 L ed 1211, 59 S Ct 795. 
A court has power to incur and order paid 
all expenses that are reasonable and necessary 
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been said that courts nave inherent power to summon witnesses ancf compef 
their appearance in court,10 to administer oaths,11 to issue or to honor letters 
rogatory, lz to prevent abuse of process,13 to provide counsel for the indigent,14 to 
have errors in the records corrected,15 to relieve a parly in default,16 to discipline 
attorneys at law,17 to take appropriate action in cases of contempt,18 and to do 
various other things to maintain order and to function properly as a court19 
C. ADJUDICATION POWER 
§ 80. Requirement as to actual, justiciable controversy. 
Judicial power is the power to hear and determine a controversy.20 It is the 
duty of a court to adjudicate actual or real controversies existing among parties 
with adverse interests and conflicting claims,1 Therefore, ordinarily, courts will 
for the proper administration of justice by the 
court. Schmelzel v Ada County, 16 Idaho 32, 
100 P 106 (bill for shaving and cutting hair 
of jurors not an expense necessary for the 
administration of justice); Knox County 
Council v State, 217 Ind 493, 29 NE2d 405, 
130 ALR 1427; State ex rel. Gentry v Becker, 
351 Mo 769, 174SW2d 181. 
10. Burttschell v Sheppard, 123 Tex 113, 69 
SW2d 402. 
11. State v Townley, 67 Ohio St 21, 65 NE 
149. 
12. McClure v McClintock, 150 Ky 265, 
773, 150 SW 332, 849 (power to issue com-
mission for taking deposition in another state); 
Electric Reduction Co. v Crane. 239 Miss 18, 
120 So 2d 765 (court had jurisdiction to 
honor request for letters rogatory by foreign 
court, to appoint commissioner to examine 
witness under those letters, and, on proper 
showing, to punish witness for contempt in re-
fusing to testify); Ex parte Taylor, 110 Tex 
331, 220 SW 74, 9 ALR 963 (power to honor 
letters rogatory). 
Annotation: 9 ALR 966, s. 108 ALR 384. 
13. Reid v Prentice-Hall, Inc. (CA6 Ohio) 
261 F2d 700; Arc Invest. Co. v Tiffith, 164 
Cal App 2d Supp 853, 330 P2d 305; Morrison 
v Guaranty Mortg. & Trust Co. 191 Miss 207, 
199 So 110. 
14. Knox County Council v State, 217 Ind 
493, 29 NE2d 405, 130 ALR 1427; State ex 
rcl. Gentry v Becker, 351 Mo 769, 174 SW2d 
181. 
• 15. Weydeveld v Weydeveld, 100 Colo 301, 
67 P2d 72; E. C. Robinson Lumber Co. v 
frazel (Mo App) 271 SW2d 610; Gottwals v 
Rencher, 60 Nev 35, 98 P2d 481, 126 ALR 
1262; State v Cannon, 244 NC 399, 94 SE2d 
339; Caprita v Caprita, 145 Ohio St 5, 60 NE 
2d 483, 158 ALR 1201; Highland v Strosnider, 
H 8 W V a 6 4 7 , 191SE531 . 
16. Merrill v District Court of Fifth Judi-
cial Dist. 73 Wyo 58, 272 P2d 597. 
The discretionary authority to relieve a 
Party in default is inherent in all courts of 
^cord exercising a general jurisdiction, inde-
pendent of statute. United States Fidelity & 
G. Co. v Poctker, 180 Ind 255, 102 NE 372, 
error dismd 235 US 683, 59 L ed 423, 35 S Ct 
201. 
17. See 7 Am Tur 2d, ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
§§ 15-18. 
l a . Wells v Gilliam (DC Va) 196 F Supp 
792; West v Field, 181 Ga 152, 181 SE 661, 
101 ALR 465; People ex rel. Rusch v White, 
554 III 465, 166 NE 100t 64 ALR 1006; State 
ex tel. Brubaker v Pritchard, 236 Ind 222, 138 
NE2d 233, 60 ALR2d 1239; Re Huff, 352 
Mfch 402, 91 NW2d 613; Hernreich v Quinn, 
350 Mo 770, 168 SW2d 1054; State v Fred-
lock, 52 W Va 232, 43 SE 153; Re Mayne's 
Estate (Wyo) 345 P2d 790. 
19. Wells v Gilliam (DC Va) 196 F Supp 
792 (holding that inherent powers include 
the power to maintain order in the court, to 
protect the court or its officers from being 
disturbed in the exercise of their functions, 
to control the conduct of those attending 
court, and to control the courtroom); Dukes v 
State, 11 Ind 557 (the court possesses in-
herent power to appoint an attorney of the 
court to conduct prosecution of a criminal 
wh^n this is necessary to prevent the failure 
of justice); State ex rel. Gentry v Becker, 351 
Mo 769, 174 SW2d 181 (no place or facil-
ities for holding court being provided, the 
court has the inherent power to provide the 
necessary place and equipment; since a court 
cannot properly function without certain at-
taches and attendants, it may, as long as the 
necessity exists, appoint such attaches and at-
tendants as are necessary to enable it to prop-
erly function as a court) ; Latham v Casey & 
King Corp. 23 Wis 2d 311, 127 NW2d 225 
(court has inherent power to dismiss an ac-
tion. in interest of the orderly administration of 
justice). 
20. James H. Rhodes & Co. v Chausovsky, 
1 3 7 N J L 4 5 9 , 60 A2d 623. 
Ijnless there is power to hear, determine, 
and decide legal controversies there is no 
court. Klein v Hutton, 49 ND 248, 191 NW 
485 (holding conciliation board not a court). 
1» Ashwander v Tennessee Valley Authority, 
297 US 288, 80 L ed 688, 56 S Ct 466, reh 
441 
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necessarily make the whole case moot where attendant questions are, or remain, 
conho\ersial,19 for instance, the question of costs 20 
A "moot case ' must be distinguished from a "test case,"1 which is character-
ized not by lack of an actual controvert between ad\crsc parties, but b\ the 
motive to obtain, for general guidance, and generally pnor to the institution 
of similar lawsuits, a judicial determination of an important question 2 Thus, 
the fact that a person boarded a streetcar for the purpose of making a test case 
as to the amount of fare demandable does not affect his nght to maintain an 
action for an unlawful ejection after he had tendered the fee actualh due 3 
Ordinarily, wheie a case has become moot, the defendant is entitled to ask 
for a dismissal of the action on that ground.4 But the courts ha\e the authority, 
and often the duty, to dismiss a moot case on their own initiative, without any 
motion to dismiss having been made.5 
D. RULEMAKING 
§ 82. Generally. 
It is competent for courts to make and enforce reasonable rules regulating 
the practice of cases pending before them 6 In some jurisdictions rulemaking 
powers are specifically conferred on courts either bv constitutional provisions7 
or by statute.8 However, it has been said many times that courts have an 
inherent power to prescnbe such rules of procedure or practice as may be 
necessary for the proper administration of justice.9 And in some cases it is 
19. The fact that one convicted of crime 
and sentenced therefor has served his sentence 
does not necessarily render an appeal moot 
where the conviction is attended with other 
consequences of a substantial nature Fiswick 
v United States, 329 US 211, 91 L ed 196, 67 
S Gt 224 
The question whether a real-estate broker's 
license has been properly revoked does not 
become moot upon expiration of the period 
for which the license was issued, where the 
ground for its revocation may be also a ground 
for withholding a new license Rattray v 
Scudder 28 Cal 2d 214, 169 P2d 371, 164 
ALR 1356 
20. Heitmuller v Stokes, 256 US 359, 65 L 
ed 990, 41 S Ct 522 
1. Ballentine's Law Diet 2d ed p 831. 
2 Stark v Wickard, 321 US 288, 88 L ed 
733, 64 S Ct 559 (if numerous parallel cases 
are filed, courts may stay litigation in other 
cases until determination of test case). 
3 . Adams v Union R Co 21 R l 134, 42 
A 515 
4. United States v W T Grant Co 345 US 
629, 97 L ed 1303, 73 S Ct 894, Jones v 
Montague, 194 US 147, 48 L ed 913, 24 S Ct 
611 (where nothing but moot case remains, 
motion to dismiss must be sustained) 
5. Magraw v Donovan (DC Minn) 177 F 
Supp 803 
6. Lehnen v Hines, 88 Kan 58, 127 P 612. 
4 4 4 
7 State v Bailey, 165 La 341, 115 So 613, 
58 ALR 1, Winberry v Salisbury, 5 NJ 240, 
74 A2d 406, cert den 340 US 877, 95 L ed 
638, 71 S C t 123 
Rules of court adopted pursuant to constitu-
tional authority supersede inconsistent stat-
utes Jawor^ki v Opa-Locka (Fla) 149 So 2d 
33, transf (Fla App) 149 So 2d 566 
8. Hudson v Parker, 156 US 277, 39 L ed 
424 15 S Gt 450, Re Dattilo, 136 Conn 488, 
72 A2d 50, Ownbe> v Morgan (Sup) 30 Del 
(7 Boyce) 297, 105 A 838 affd 256 US 94, 
65 L ed 837, 41 S Gt 433 17 ALR 873, 
Weil v Federal L Ins Go 264 III 425, 106 NE 
246, M K Goet? Biewing Go v Wain 92 
Neb 614, 139 NW 230, State v Roy, 40 NM 
397, 60 P2d 646, 110 \ L R 1, Roberts v 
White, 32 RI 185, 78 A 497, Maryville v 
Waters, 207 Tenn 213, 338 SW2d 608, Davis 
v Dunn, 90 Vt 253 98 A 81, Stevenson \ Mil-
waukee County, 140 Wis 14, 121 NW 654 
Annotation: 110 ALR 28, s 158 ALR 707. 
A statute which authorizes a court to adopt 
and promulgate rules of practice is not un-
constitutional as an attempt to delegate legis-
lative power to the judiciary Sibbach v 
Wilson & Co 312 US 1, 85 L ed 479, 61 S Ct 
422, Florida State Bar Asso 's Petition, 155 Fla 
710, 21 So 2d 605, 158 ALR 699, Diversey 
Liquidating Corp v Neunkirchen, 370 111 523, 
1 9 N E 2 d 3 6 3 , 120 ALR 1395 
9 Fall v Eastin, 215 US 1, 54 L ed 65, 30 
S Ct 3, Ex parte Wilkey, 233 Ala 375, 172 
So 111, Christy v Speer, 210 Ark 756, 197 
SW2d 466, Re Dattilo, 136 Conn 488, 72 A2d 
50, Slagle v Valenziano, 13 \ Ind App 360, 
20 Am Jur 2d COURTS § 83 
said that the rulemaking power of a court may not be validly interfered with 
by the legislature.10 
Although the rulemaking power is generally vested in the highest court of a 
jurisdiction,11 and this includes the power to make rules regulating the pro-
cedure and practice in courts the decisions of which are subject to its review,12 
lower courts may also have such power.13 The rule of a lower court must not, 
however, conflict with the rules prescribed by the higher court,14 and in some 
jurisdictions a rule prescribed by a lower court is subject to approval by the 
highest court.15 
A rule of court must be distinguished from a mere custom of a court,16 though 
a long-established practice, uniformly followed by the courts, may have the same 
clicet as a rule of court.17 
§ 83. How rules promulgated. 
Although it has been said that rules of court must be published in some 
permanent form so as to give notice thereof to anyone they do or might affect,18 
and that rules cannot be promulgated orally, but must be written,19 orally 
lflfl NE2d 286; Re Sparrow, 338 Mo 203, 90 
S\V2d 401; State v Roy, 40 NM 397, 60 P2d 
h Hi. 110 ALR 1; Goodwin v Bickford, 20 Okla 
«»1. 93 P 548; Zeuske v Zeuske, 55 Or 65, 
H»i P 648, 105 P 249; Ashford v Goodwin, 
1«.; Tex 491, 131 SW 535; Harris v Harris, 
1M» Va 351, 186 SE 29; Stevenson v Mil-
waukee County, 140 Wis 14, 121 NW 654. 
Annotation: 110 ALR 23, s. 158 ALR 706. 
10. Parkison v Thompson, 164 Ind 609, 
7 J NE 109 (legislature has no more right to 
break clown the rules prescribed by a court for 
• ••mlucting its official business than the court 
Ins to prescribe the mode and manner in 
v. !ii« h the legislature shall perform its legisla-
tive duties); Burton v Mayer, 274 Ky 263, 
11.". S\V2d 547; Jordan v Andrus, 26 Mont 37, 
«••» P ")02: Herndon v Imperial F. Ins. Go. I l l 
NC'.JM, 16SE465. 
Annotation: 110 ALR 37, s. 158 ALR 709. 
11. Washington-Southern Nav. Co. v Balti-
more & P. S. B. Go. 263 US 629, 68 L ed 
»w. U S Ct 220; Guthrie v Blakely, 127 Ind 
\|>1> 1 10, 131 NE2d 357 (intermediate appel-
l.itr court has no authority to amend, alter, or 
• i-norc rule of Supreme Court); M. K. Goetz 
Hn-winir
 C a v W a l n ? 92 N e b 6 1 4 > 139 NW 
•": State v Roy, 40 NM 397, 60 P2d 646, 
!
- ' ALR I; Roberts v White, 32 R I 185, 78 
\ W : Wcibrl v Gardner, 45 SD 349, 187 NW 
••-"'. in ALR 50; Davis v Dunn, 90 Vt 253, 
' • i A R l . 
Annotation: 110 ALR 55, s. 158 ALR 728. 
12. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v Standard 
Asphalt & Rubber Co. 275 US 372, 72 L ed 
'}<> - 4 8 S Ct 183; Winberry v Salisbury, 5 
• J
 ; 1<>. 74 A2d 406, cert den 340 US 877, 95 
[: H fK*a, 71 S Ct 123. But see Yazoo & M. 
>;;"'-v R. Co. v Kirk, 102 Miss 41, 58 So 
f/., " 'f t a k m S the position that the highest 
'•urt of
 a s t a t e k a s n o a u t j l o r j t y t o prescribe 
• '
 , !<T proceedings in the trial court. 
1 3
 kronx Brass Foundry v Irving Trust Co. 
297 US 230, 80 L ed 657, 56 S Ct 451 (ap-
proving rule of District Court regulating exer-
cise of right of voluntary discontinuance); 
Gist v Drakely, 2 Gill (Md) 330; Roberts v 
White, 32 RI 185, 78 A 497; Ashford v Good-
win, 103 Tex 491, 131 SW 535; Okerlund v 
Robinson, 74 Utah 602, 201 P 200 (referring 
to statute conferring power on every court of 
record to adopt rules for its government). 
General orders of the Supreme Court may 
be supplemented by local rules. Re G. W. 
Giannini, Inc. (GA2 NY) 90 F2d 445, 111 
ALR 1492. 
14. Los Angeles Brush Mfg. Co. v James, 
272 US 701, 71 L ed 481, 47 S Ct 286; Re 
Nuotila Estate, 360 Mich 256, 103 NW2d 
638, 82 ALR2d 923; Davis v Dunn, 90 Vt 
253, 98 A 81 ; Stevenson v Milwaukee County, 
140 Wis 14, 121 NW654 . 
Annotation: 110 ALR 51, s. 158 ALR 715. 
15. Roberts v White, 32 RI 185, 78 A 497. 
16. Patton v Evans, 92 Utah 524, 69 P2d 
969, 112 ALR 589, holding that a custom 
in the state court to postpone the trial of a 
case reached for trial when attorneys are en-
gaged in trying a case in a federal court, until 
the completion of the trial in the federal 
court, does not have the force and effect of a 
rule of court so as to entitle the party whose 
attorney is so engaged to a continuance as a 
matter of right. 
17. Payne v Garth (GA8 Neb) 285 F 301; 
Detroit Heating & Lighting Co. v Kemp (CC 
Md) 182 F 848; Patton v Evans, 92 Utah 
524, 69 P2d 969, 112 ALR 589 (holding, 
however, that this does not apply to a question 
of judicial courtesy or judicial administra-
tion, by a court, of its calendar). 
18. McDonald v State, 172 Ind 393, 88 NE 
673; Brewer v State, 187 Tcnn 396, 215 SW2d 
798. 
19. Naro v State, 212 Ala 5, 101 So 666 
4 4 5 
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Sec. 13. [Board of Examiners.] 
Until otherwise provided by law, the Governor, At-
torney General, and State Auditor shall constitute a 
Board of Examiners, with power to examine all such 
claims against the State as provided by law, and per-
form such other duties as provided by law, and no 
such claim against the State shall be passed upon by 
the Legislature without having been considered and 
acted upon by the Board of Examiners 1979 
Sec. 14. [Duties of Lieutenant Governor.! 
The Lieutenant Governor shall serve on all boards 
and commissions m lieu of the Governor whenever so 
designated by the Governor, shall perform such du-
ties as may be delegated by the Governor, and shall 
perform such other duties as may be provided by law 
1979 
Sec. 15. [Duties of State Auditor and State 
Treasurer.l 
The State Auditor shall perform financial post 
audits of Public Accounts, except as otherwise pro-
vided by this Constitution, and the State Treasurer 
shall be the custodian of public moneys, and each 
shall perform such other duties as provided by law 
1979 
Sec. 16. [Duties of A t to rney General . ] 
The Attorney General shall be the legal adviser of 
the State officers, except as otherwise provided by 
this Constitution, and shall perform such other duties 
as provided by law 1979 
Sec. 17. [Repealed.] 1986 
Sec. 18. [Compensation of s ta te and district of-
ficers.] 
The Governor, Lieutenant Governor, State Auditor, 
State Treasurer, Attorney General and such other 
State and District officers as provided for by law, 
shall receive for their services a compensation as 
fixed by law 
The compensation for said officers as provided in 
all laws enacted pursuant to this Constitution, shall 
be in full for all services rendered by said officers, 
respectively, in any official capacity or employment 
during their respective terms of office No such officer 
shall receive for the performance of any official duty 
any fee for personal use, but all fees fixed by law for 
the performance by either of them of any official duty, 
shall be collected in advance and deposited with the 
State Treasurer monthly to the credit of the State 
The Legislature may provide for the payment of ac-
tual and necessary expenses of said officers while 
traveling in the performan ce of official duties 1979 
Sec. 19. [Grants and commissions.] 
All grants and commissions shall be in the name 
and by the authonty of the State of Utah, sealed with 
the Great Seal of the State, signed by the Governor, 
and countersigned by such officer as provided by law 
1979 
Sec 20. [The Great Seal.] 
There shall be a seal of the State, which shall be 
called "The Great Seal of the State of Utah," and 
shall be kept by such officer as provided by law 1979 
Sec. 21. [United States' officials ineligible to 
hold state office.] 
No person, while holding any office under the 
United States' government shall hold any office un-
der the State government of Utah 1979 
Sees. 22,23. [Transferred.] i960 
Sec. 24. [Repealed.] 1979 
\RTICLE VIII 
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 
Section 
1 [Judicial powers — Courts ] 
2 [Supreme court — Chief justice — Declaring law 
unconstitutional — Justice unable to 
participate ] 
3 [Jurisdiction of Supreme Court ] 
4 [Rule-making power of Supreme Court — Judges 
pro tempore — Regulation of practice 
of law ] 
5 [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts — 
Right of appeal ] 
6 [Number of judges of district court and other 
courts — Divisions ] 
7 [Qualifications of justices and judges ] 
8 [Vacancies — Nominating commissions — Senate 
approval] 
9 [Judicial retention elections ] 
10 [Restrictions on justices and judges ] 
11 [Judges of courts not of record ] 
12 [Judicial Council — Chief justice as administra 
tive officer ] 
13 [Judicial Conduct Commission ] 
14 [Compensation of justices and judges ] 
15 [Mandatory retirement ] 
16 [Public prosecutors ] 
17 to 28 [Repealed ] 
Section 1. [Judicial powers — Courts.] 
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a 
supreme court, in a trial court of general jurisdiction 
known as the district court, and in such other courts 
as the Legislature by statute may establish The Su 
preme Court, the district court, and such other courts 
designated by statute shall be courts of record Courts 
not of record shall also be established by statute 1984 
Sec. 2. [Supreme court — Chief justice — De-
claring law unconstitutional — Justice 
unable to participate.] 
The Supreme Court shall be the highest court and 
shall consist of at least five justices The number of 
justices may be changed by statute, but no change 
shall have the effect of removing a justice from office 
A chief justice shall be selected from among the jus 
tices of the Supreme Court as provided by statute 
The chief justice may resign as chief justice without 
resigning from the Supreme Court The Supreme 
Court by rule may sit and render final judgment ei 
ther en banc or in divisions The court shall not de 
clare any law unconstitutional under this constitu 
tion or the Constitution of the United States, except 
on the concurrence of a majority of all justices of the 
Supreme Court If a justice of the Supreme Court 1* 
disqualified or otherwise unable to participate in a 
cause before the court, the chief justice, or in the 
event the chief justice is disqualified or unable to par 
ticipate, the remaining justices, shall call an active 
judge from an appellate court or the district court to 
participate in the cause 19W 
Sec. 3. [Jurisdiction of Supreme Court.] 
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction 
to issue all extraordinary writs and to answer ques 
tions of state law certified by a court of the Unite 
States The Supreme Court shall have appellate juris 
diction over all other matters to be exercised as P r 0 
vided by statute, and power to issue all writs an 
orders necessary for the exercise of the Supreme 
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Court's jurisdiction or the complete determination of 
any cause iW4 
gee. 4* [Rule-making p o w e r of Supreme Court 
— J u d g e s pro tempore — Regulation 
of practice of law.l 
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure 
and evidence to be used in the courts of the state and 
ghall by rule manage the appellate process The Leg-
islature may amend the Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a vote of 
two-thirds of all members of both houses of the Legis-
lature Except as otherwise provided by this constitu-
tion, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize re-
tired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to 
perform any judicial duties Judges pro tempore shall 
be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and 
admitted to practice law m Utah The Supreme Court 
by rule shall govern the practice of law, including 
admission to practice law and the conduct and disci-
pline of persons admitted to practice law 1984 
Sec. 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other 
courts — Right of appeal.] 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in 
all matters except as limited by this constitution or 
by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary writs 
The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as 
provided by statute The jurisdiction of all other 
courts, both original and appellate, shall be provided 
by statute Except for matters filed originally with 
the Supreme Court, there shall be m all cases an 
appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction 
to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause 
1984 
Sec. 6. [Number of judges of district court and 
other courts — Divisions.] 
The number of judges of the district court and of 
other courts of record established by the Legislature 
thall be provided by statute No change in the num-
ber of judges shall have the effect of removing a judge 
from office during a judge's term of office Geographic 
divisions for all courts of record except the Supreme 
Court may be provided by statute No change in divi-
sions shall have the effect of removing a judge from 
office during a judge's term of office 1984 
S e c 7. [Qualifications of just ices and judges.] 
Supreme Court justices shall be at least 30 years 
old, United States citizens, Utah residents for five 
years preceding selection, and admitted to practice 
law in Utah Judges of other courts of record shall be 
at least 25 years old, United States citizens, Utah 
residents for three years preceding selection, and ad-
nutted to practice law in Utah If geographic divi-
sions are provided for any court, judges of that court 
snail reside in the geographic division for which they 
w* selected 1984 
^ e * 8. [Vacancies — Nominat ing commiss ions 
— Senate approval.] 
When a vacancy occurs in a court of record, the 
governor shall fill the vacancy by appointment from a 
"& of at least three nominees certified to the gover-
nor
 by the Judicial Nominating Commission having 
authority over the vacancy The governor shall fill 
«e vacancy within 30 days after receiving the list of 
nominees If the governor fails to fill the vacancy 
^ithin the time prescribed, the chief justice of the 
Supreme Court shall within 20 days make the ap-
pointment from the list of nominees The Legislature 
°y statute shall provide for the nominating commis-
sions' composition and procedures No member of the 
Legislature may serve as a member of, nor may the 
Legislature appoint members to, any Judicial Nomi-
nating Commission The Senate shall consider and 
render a decision on each judicial appointment within 
30 days of the date of appointment If necessary, the 
Senate shall convene itself in extraordinary session 
for the purpose of considering judicial appointments 
The appointment shall be effective upon approval of a 
majority of all members of the Senate If the Senate 
fails to approve the appointment, the office shall be 
considered vacant and a new nominating process 
shall commence Selection of judges shall be based 
solely upon consideration of fitness for office without 
regard to any partisan political considerations 1984 
Sec. 9. [Judicial retention elections.! 
Each appointee to a court of record shall be subject 
to an unopposed retention election at the first general 
election held more than three years after appoint-
ment Following initial voter approval, each Supreme 
Court justice every tenth year, and each judge of 
other courts of record every sixth year, shall be sub-
ject to an unopposed retention election at the corre-
sponding general election Judicial retention elec-
tions shall be held on a nonpartisan ballot in a man-
ner provided by statute If geographic divisions are 
provided for any court of record, the judges of those 
courts shall stand for retention election only in the 
geographic division to which they are selected 1984 
Sec. 10. [Restrictions on justices and judges.] 
Supreme court justices, district court judges, and 
judges of all other courts of record while holding office 
may not practice law, hold any elective nonjudicial 
public office, or hold office m a political party 1984 
Sec. 11. [Judges of courts not of record.l 
Judges of courts not of record shall be selected m a 
manner, for a term, and with qualifications provided 
by statute However, no qualification may be imposed 
which requires judges of courts not of record to be 
admitted to practice law The number of judges of 
courts not of record shall be provided by statute 1984 
Sec 12. [Judicial Council — Chief justice as ad-
ministrative officer.! 
A Judicial Council is established, which shall adopt 
rules for the administration of the courts of the state 
The Judicial Council shall consist of the chief justice 
of the Supreme Court, as presiding officer, and such 
other justices, judges, and other persons as provided 
by statute There shall be at least one representative 
on the Judicial Council from each court established 
by the constitution or by statute The chief justice of 
the Supreme Court shall be the chief administrative 
officer for the courts and shall implement the rules 
adopted by the Judicial Council 1984 
Sec. 13. [Judicial Conduct Commission.] 
A Judicial Conduct Commission is established 
which shall investigate and conduct confidential 
hearings regarding complaints against any justice or 
judge Following its investigations and hearings, the 
Judicial Conduct Commission may order the repn 
mand, censure, suspension, removal, or involuntary 
retirement of any justice or judge for the following 
(1) action which constitutes willful misconduct 
m office, 
(2) final conviction of a crime punishable as a 
felony under state or federal law, 
(3) willful and persistent failure to perform ju-
dicial duties, 
89 CRIMINAL CODE 76-3-301 
(1) A person who has been convicted of a capital 
felony shall be sentenced in accordance with Section 
76-3-207, and sentence shall be death or life impris-
onment as the court or jury, in accordance with this 
section, shall determine. 
(2) The judgment of conviction and sentence of 
death shall be subject to automatic review by the 
Utah State Supreme Court within 60 days after certi-
fication by the sentencing court of the entire record 
unless time is extended an additional period not to 
exceed 30 days by the Utah State Supreme Court for 
good cause shown. Such review by the Utah State 
Supreme Court shall have priority over all other 
cases and shall be heard in accordance with rules 
promulgated by the Utah State Supreme Court. 1977 
76-3-207. Capital felony — Sentencing proceed-
ing. 
(1) When a defendant has pled guilty to or been 
found guilty of a capital felony, there shall be further 
proceedings before the court or jury on the issue of 
sentence. In the case of a plea of guilty to a capital 
felony, the sentencing proceedings shall be conducted 
by the court which accepted the plea or by a jury upon 
request of the defendant. When a defendant has been 
found guilty of a capital felony, the proceedings shall 
be conducted before the court or jury which found the 
defendant guilty, provided the defendant may waive 
hearing before the jury, in which event the hearing 
shall be before the court. If, however, circumstances 
make it impossible or impractical to reconvene the 
same jury for the sentencing proceedings the court 
may dismiss that jury and convene a new jury for 
such proceedings. If a retrial of the sentencing pro-
ceedings is necessary as a consequence of a remand 
from an appellate court, the sentencing authority 
shall be determined as provided in Subsection (4). 
(2) In these sentencing proceedings, evidence may 
be presented as to any matter the court deems rele-
vant to sentence, including but not limited to the na-
ture and circumstances of the crime, the defendant's 
character, background, history, mental and physical 
condition, and any other facts in aggravation or miti-
gation of the penalty. Any evidence the court deems 
to have probative force may be received regardless of 
its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evi-
dence. The state's attorney and the defendant shall be 
permitted to present argument for or against sen-
tence of death. Aggravating circumstances shall in-
clude those as outlined in Section 76-5-202. Mitigat-
ing circumstances shall include the following: 
(a) the defendant has no significant history of 
prior criminal activity; 
(b) the homicide was committed while the de-
fendant was under the influence of extreme men-
tal or emotional disturbance; 
(c) the defendant acted under extreme duress 
or under the substantial domination of another 
person; 
(d) at the time of the homicide, the capacity of 
the defendant to appreciate the criminality 
(wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirement of law was substan-
tially impaired as a result of mental disease, in-
toxication, or influence of drugs; 
(e) the youth of the defendant at the time of 
the crime; 
(f) the defendant was an accomplice in the ho-
micide committed by another person and his par-
ticipation was relatively minor; and 
(g) any other fact in mitigation of the penalty. 
(3) The court or jury, as the case may be, shall 
retire to consider the penalty. In all proceedings be-
fore a jury, under this section, it shall be instructed 
as to the punishment to be imposed upon a unani-
mous verdict for death and that to be imposed if a 
unanimous verdict for death is not found. If the jury 
reports unanimous agreement to impose the sentence 
of death, the court shall discharge the jury and shall 
impose the sentence of death. If the jury is unable to 
reach a unanimous verdict imposing the sentence of 
death, the court shall discharge the jury and impose 
the sentence of life imprisonment. 
(4) Upon any appeal by the defendant where the 
sentence is of death, the appellate court, if it finds 
prejudicial error in the sentencing proceeding only, 
may set aside the sentence of death and remand the 
case to the trial court for new sentencing proceedings 
to the extent necessary to correct the error or errors. 
No error in the sentencing proceedings shall result in 
the reversal of the conviction of a capital felony. In 
cases of remand for new sentencing proceedings, all 
exhibits and a transcript of all testimony and other 
evidence properly admitted in the prior trial and sen-
tencing proceedings shall be admissible in the new 
sentencing proceedings, and if the sentencing pro-
ceeding was before a: 
(a) jury a new jury shall be impaneled for the 
new sentencing proceeding; 
(b) judge, the original trial judge shall conduct 
the new sentencing proceeding; or 
(c) judge and the original trial judge is unable 
or unavailable to conduct a new sentencing pro-
ceeding, then another judge shall be designated 
to conduct the new sentencing proceeding. 
(5) In the event the dea th penal ty is held to be 
unconstitutional by the U t a h Supreme Court or the 
United States Supreme Court, the court having jur is-
diction over a person previously sentenced to death 
for a capital felony shall cause such person to be 
brought before the court, and the court shall sentence 
the person to life imprisonment, and any person who 
is thereafter convicted of a capital felony shall be sen-
tenced to life imprisonment. 1991 
76-3-208. Imprisonment — Custodial authori-
ties. 
(1) Persons sentenced to imprisonment shall be 
committed to the following custodial authorities: 
(a) Felony commitments shall be to the Utah 
State Prison; 
(b) Class A misdemeanor commitments may 
be to the Utah State Prison if the defendant con-
sents; 
(c) Misdemeanor commitments shall be to the 
jail, or other facility designated by the town, city 
or county where the defendant was convicted. 
(2) Custodial authorities may place a prisoner in a 
facility other than the one to which he was committed 
when: 
(a) It does not have space to accommodate him; 
or 
(b) The security of the institution or inmate 
requires it. 1974 
P A R T 3 
FINES A N D SPECIAL SANCTIONS 
76-3-301. Fines of persons . 
(1) A person convicted of an offense may be sen-
tenced to pay a fine, not exceeding: 
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nffior offense as described in Section 76-3-407, is 
aot eligible for release on parole by the Board of 
Pardons until the offender has fully completed 
serving the minimum mandatory sentence rni-
D0Sed by the court This subsection supersedes 
any other provision of law 
*~ (b) The board may not parole any offender or 
commute or terminate the sentence of any of-
fender before the offender has served the mini-
mum term for the offense, where 
(1) the offender was convicted of forcible 
sexual abuse, forcible sodomy, rape, aggra-
vated assault, kidnapping, aggravated kid-
napping, or aggravated sexual assault as de-
fined in Chapter 5, Title 76, and 
(u) the victim of the offense was under 18 
years of age at the time the offense was com-
mitted 
(3) The board may issue subpoenas to compel the 
tendance of witnesses and the production of evi-
dence, to administer oaths, and to take testimony for 
tfae purpose of any investigation by the board or any 
of its members or by a designated hearing examiner 
fak the performance of its duties A person who will-
fctly disobeys a properly served subpoena issued by 
$ § board is guilty of a class B misdemeanor 
tufa) (a) The board may adopt rules consistent with 
law for its government, meetings and hearings, 
the conduct of proceedings before it, the parole 
and pardon of offenders, the commutation and 
termination of sentences, and the general condi-
tions under which parole may be granted and 
revoked. 
(b) The rules shall ensure an adequate oppor-
tunity for victims to participate at hearings held 
under this chapter, as provided in Section 
77-27-9 5 
(c) The rules may allow the board to establish 
reasonable and equitable time limits on the pre-
sentations by all participants m hearings held 
m under this chapter 
(5) The board does not provide counseling or ther-
apy for victims as a part of their participation in any 
hearing under this chapter 1988 
77-27-9.5. Victim may attend hearings. 
(1) (a) As used in this section, "hearing" means a 
hearing for a parole grant or revocation, or a re-
hearing of either of these if the offender is 
present 
* (b) At a redetermination or special attention 
hearing, if the offender is not present, the victim 
is not permitted to be present However, under 
this subsection the board shall give consideration 
to any presentation previously given by the vic-
tim, regarding that offender 
(2) When a hearing is held regarding any offense 
Jjmmitted by the defendant that involved the victim, 
« • victim may attend the hearing to present his 
Jj**8 concerning the decisions to be made regarding 
« • defendant 
(3) The notice of the hearing shall be timely sent to 
™& victim at his most recent address of record with 
° * Board of Pardons The notice shall include 
(a) the date, time, and location of the hearing, 
(b) a clear statement of the reason for the 
hearing, including all offenses involved, 
(c) the statutes and rules applicable to the vic-
tim's participation in the hearing, and 
(d) the address and telephone number of an 
office or person the victim may contact for fur-
ther explanation of the procedure regarding vic-
tim participation in the hearing 
(4) The victim, or family members if the victim is 
deceased or unable to attend due to physical incapac-
ity, may 
(a) attend the hearing to observe, 
(b) make a statement to the board or its ap-
pointed examiner either in person or through a 
representative appointed by the victim or his 
family, and 
(c) remain present for the hearing if he ap-
points another to make a statement on his be-
half 
(5) The statement may be presented 
(a) as a written statement, which may also be 
read aloud, if the presenter desires, or 
(b) as an oral statement presented by the per-
son selected under Subsection (4) 
(6) The victim may be accompanied by a member of 
his family or another individual, present to provide 
emotional support to the victim 
(7) The victim may, upon request, testify outside 
the presence of the defendant but a separate hearing 
may not be held for this purpose 1988 
77-27-9.7. Victim right to notification of release 
— Notice by board. 
A victim entitled to notice of the hearings regard-
ing parole under Section 77-27-9 5 shall also be noti-
fied by the Board of Pardons of the nght of victims to 
be advised upon request of other releases of the defen-
dant under Section 64-13-14 7 The board may in-
clude this notification in the same notice sent under 
Section 77-27-9 5 The board shall coordinate with 
the Department of Corrections to ensure notice under 
this section is provided to victims 1991 
77-27-10. Conditions of parole. 
(1) When the Board of Pardons releases an offender 
on parole, it shall issue to the parolee a certificate 
setting forth the conditions of parole which he shall 
accept and agree to as evidenced by his signature 
affixed to the agreement A copy of the agreement 
shall be delivered to the Department of Corrections 
and a copy shall be given to the parolee The original 
shall remain with the board's file 
(2) If an offender convicted of violating or attempt-
ing to violate Section 76-5-301 1, Subsection 
76-5-302(1), Section 76-5-402, 76-5-402 1, 76-5-402 2, 
76-5-402 3, 76-5-403, 76y-5-4031, 76-5-404, 76-5-
404 1, or 76-5-405 is released on parole, the board 
shall order outpatient mental health counseling and 
treatment as a condition of parole 1986 
77-27-11. Revocation of parole. 
(1) The board may revoke the parole of any person 
who is found to have violated any condition of his 
parole 
(2) If a parolee is detained by the Department of 
Corrections or any law enforcement official for a sus-
pected violation of parole, the Department of Correc-
tions shall immediately report the alleged violation 
to the board, by means of an incident report, and 
make any recommendation regarding the incident 
No parolee may be held for a penod longer than 72 
hours, excluding weekends and holidays, without 
first obtaining a warrant 
(3) Any member of the board may issue a warrant 
based upon a certified warrant request to a peace offi-
cer or other persons authorized to arrest, detain, and 
return to actual custody a parolee, and may upon ar-
rest or otherwise direct the Department of Correc-
tions to determine if there is probable cause to believe 
78-2-3 JUDICIAL CODE 
living together in illicit relations or under 
void marriage, 31 A. L. R. 2d 1315. 
Jurisdiction in actions involving re-em-
ployment of discharged servicemen, 29 
A. L. E. 2d 1340, 9 A. L. E. Fed. 225. 
Mandamus to governor, 105 A. L. E. 
1124. 
Power of appellate court to reconsider 
its decision after mandate has issued, 84 
A. L. E. 579. 
Power of court to conduct general in-
vestigation of practices of members of bar 
without charges against particular mem-
bers, 60 A. L. E. 860. 
Power of legislature, absent constitu-
tional provision in that regard, to author-
ize or require court or justices thereof 
to render advisory opinion upon request 
of governor or of either house of legis-
lature, 103 A. L. E. 1087. 
Prospective or retroactive operation 
of overruling decision, 10 A. L. E. 3d 1371. 
Eight of winning party to appeal from 
judgment granting him full relief sought, 
69 A. L. E. 2d 701. 
Stay or supersedeas on appellate review 
in mandamus proceeding, 88 A. L. E. 2d 
420. 
Superintending control over inferior tri-
bunals, 112 A. L. E. 1351. 
Law Reviews. 
The Utah Supreme Court and the Eule 
of Law: Phillips and the Bill of Eights 
in Utah, Edwin B. Firmage, 1975 Utah L. 
Eev. 593. 
DECISIONS UNDEE FOEMEE LAW 
Chancery jurisdiction. 
Territorial Supreme Court had original 
chancery jurisdiction to issue injunctions. 
Kerr v. Woolley, 3 U. 456, 24 P. 831. 
Jurisdiction generally. 
Predecessor section conferred the only 
original jurisdiction possessed by Supreme 
Court; in all other cases its jurisdiction 
was appellate, and it was to be classed as 
a court mainly appellate. Godbe v. Salt 
Lake City, 1 U. 68. 
Mandamus. 
Territorial Supreme Court had no au-
thority to issue a writ of mandamus in 
exercise of its original jurisdiction. Shep-
perd v. District Court of Second Judicial 
Dist., 1 U. 340. 
Prohibition. 
Under Code of Civil Procedure of 1884, 
territorial Supreme Court had original ju-
risdiction to issue writs of prohibition. 
Yearian v. Speirs, 4 U. 385, 10 P. 609, 11 
P. 509, overruled on other grounds in 
People v. Douglass, 5 U. 283, 14 P. 801. 
Territorial Supreme Court had unques-
tionable authority to issue writ of pro-
hibition in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. 
Yearian v. Speirs, 4 U. 385, 10 P. 609, 11 
P. 509, overruled on other grounds in 
People v. Douglass, 5 U. 283, 14 P. 801. 
78-2-3. Three justices must concur in judgment.—The concurrence of 
three justices of the Supreme Court is necessary to pronounce a judgment; 
if three do not concur, the case must be reheard. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, §1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-25-3. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is identical with former 
section 20-2-3 (Code 1943) which was re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 
What constitutes "concurrence." 
Concurrence by district judge sitting for 
disqualified justice was sufficient compli-
ance with predecessor section. In re 
Thompson's Estate, 72 U. 17, 269 P. 103. 
Collateral References. 
Courts<§=>102, 248. 
21 C.J.S. Courts § 465. 
20 Am. Jur. 2d 432, Courts §§ 67-69. 
78-2-4. Rules-making power.—The Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
has power to prescribe, alter and revise, by rules, for all courts of the 
State of Utah, the forms of process, writs, pleadings and motions and the 
practice and procedure in all civil and criminal actions and proceedings 
including rules of evidence therein, and also divorce, probate and guard 
ianship proceedings. Such rules may not abridge, enlarge or modify the 
substantive rights of any litigant. Upon promulgation the Supreme Court 
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shall fix the date when such rules shall take effect and thereafter all laws 
in conflict therewith providing for procedure in courts only shall be of 
no further force and effect. Nothing in this title, anything therein to 
the contrary notwithstanding, shall in any way limit, supersede or repeal 
any such rules heretofore prescribed by the Supreme Court. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, §1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-2-4. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is identical with section 
20-2-4.10 (Code 1943, Supp.) except for the 
addition of the last sentence by Laws 
1951, ch. 58, § 1. Section 3 of that chapter 
repealed the former section. 
Cross-Keference. 
Eight of courts of record to make own 
rules, 78-7-6. 
Substantive rights. 
The right to be relieved from a judg-
ment of eviction by paying the delinquent 
rent is a substantive right. Monter v. 
Kratzers Specialty Bread Co., 29 U. (2d) 
18, 504 P. 2d 40. 
Collateral References. 
Courts<&=>78-86, 248. 
21 C.J.S. Courts § 465. 
20 Am. Jur. 2d 444, Courts §§ 82-86. 
Power of court to prescribe rules of 
pleading, practice or procedure, 110 A. 
L. E. 22, 158 A. L. E. 705. 
78-2-5. Court always open for transaction of business.—The Supreme 
Court shall always be open for the transaction of business. Adjournments 
from day to day, or from time to time, are to be construed as recesses in 
the sessions, and shall not prevent the court from sitting at any time. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Cross-Reference. 
Supp., 104-2-5. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section relates generally to the 
same subject matter as former section 20-
2-5 (Code 1943) which was repealed by 
Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. The legislature in 
re-enacting this section as a part of the 
Judicial Code made substantial changes in 
the phraseology of the section. 
Terms of court, Const. Art. VIII, § 4. 
Collateral Ref erences. 
Courts<§=>248. 
21 C.J.S. Courts § 465. 
20 Am. Jur. 2d 418, Courts § 42. 
Calling of special or extra term of court 
by governor, 16 A. L. R. 1306. 
78-2-6. Clerk.—The Supreme Court shall appoint a clerk, who shall 
hold his office during the pleasure of the court. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, §1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-2-6. 
Compiler's Notes. 
This section is identical with former 
section 20-2-6 (Code 1943) which was re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. 
Cross-Eeferences. 
Appointment of clerk 
Const. Art. VIII, § 14. 
and reporter, 
Fees, 21-1-4. 
Practice of law or partnership with 
practicing attorney prohibited, 78-51-39. 
Salary of clerk, 67-8-2. 
Collateral References. 
Clerks of Courts<£=>l; Courts<®=»55, 248. 
14 C.J.S. Clerks of Courts § 1 ; 21 C.J.S. 
Courts §§ 140, 465. 
15A Am. Jur. 2d 139, Clerks of Court 
§1 . 
78-2-7. Bond.—The clerk of the Supreme Court must execute an official 
bond to the state, in the sum of $10,000, conditioned for the faithful 
performance of his duties. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, CompUer's Notes. 
Supp., 104-2-7. This section is identical with former 
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opening statement or reserve it until the prosecu-
tion has rested; 
(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in sup-
port of the charge; 
(4) When the prosecution has rested, the de-
fense may present its case; 
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only re-
butting evidence unless the court, for good cause, 
otherwise permits; 
(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any 
other appropriate time, the court shall instruct 
the jury; and 
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury 
on either side or on both sides without argument, 
the prosecution shall open the argument, the de-
fense shall follow and the prosecution may close 
by responding to the defense argument. The 
court may set reasonable limits upon the argu-
ment of counsel for each party and the time to be 
allowed for argument. 
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified 
during trial and an alternate juror has been selected, 
the case shall proceed using the alternate juror. If no 
alternate has been selected, the parties may stipulate 
to proceed with the number of jurors remaining. Oth-
erwise, the jury shall be discharged and a new trial 
ordered. 
(i) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for 
the jury to view the place in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, or in which any 
other material fact occurred, it may order them to be 
conducted in a body under the charge of an officer to 
the place, which shall be shown to them by some per-
son appointed by the court for that purpose. The offi-
cer shall be sworn that while the jury are thus con-
ducted, he will suffer no person other than the person 
so appointed to speak to them nor to do so himself on 
any subject connected with the trial and to return 
them into court without unnecessary delay or at a 
specified time. 
(j) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors 
are permitted to separate or are sequestered, they 
shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty 
not to converse among themselves or to converse 
with, or suffer themselves to be addressed by, any 
other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is 
their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon 
until the case is finally submitted to them. 
(k) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may 
take with them the instructions of the court and all 
exhibits and papers which have been received as evi-
dence, except depositions; and each juror may also 
take with him any notes of the testimony or other 
proceedings taken by himself, but none taken by any 
other person. 
(1) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, 
they shall be kept together in some convenient place 
under charge of an officer until they agree upon a 
verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by 
the court. Except by order of the court, the officer 
having them under his charge shall not allow any 
communication to be made to them, or make any him-
self, except to ask them if they have agreed upon 
their verdict, and he shall not, before the verdict is 
rendered, communicate to any person the state of 
their deliberations or the verdict agreed upon. 
(m) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if 
they desire to be informed on any point of law arising 
in the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge of 
them, who shall communicate such request to the 
court. The court may then direct that the jury be 
brought before the court where, in the presence of the 
defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond 
to the inquiry or advise the jury that no further in-
structions shall be given. Such response shall be re-
corded. The court may in its discretion respond to the 
inquiry in writing without having the jury brought 
before the court, in which case the inquiry and the 
response thereto shall be entered in the record. 
(n) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on 
its face, it may be corrected by the jury under the 
advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out again. 
(o) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prose-
cution, or at the conclusion of all the evidence, the 
court may issue an order dismissing any information 
or indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground 
that the evidence is not legally sufficient to establish 
the offense charged therein or any lesser included 
offense. 
Rule 18. Selection of jury. 
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number 
of the jurors that are to try the cause plus such an 
additional number as will allow for all peremptory 
challenges permitted. After each challenge for cause 
sustained, another juror shall be called to fill the va-
cancy before further challenges are made, and any 
such new juror may be challenged for cause. When 
the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk 
shall make a list of the jurors remaining, and each 
side, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate 
thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a 
time in regular turn, as the court may direct, until all 
peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The 
clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many 
of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury, in 
the order in which they appear on the list, and the 
persons whose names are so called shall constitute 
the jury. 
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant 
to conduct the examination of the prospective jurors 
or may itself conduct the examination. In the latter 
event, the court may permit counsel or the defendant 
to supplement the examination by such further in-
quiry as it deems proper, or may itself submit to the 
prospective jurors additional questions requested by 
counsel or the defendant. 
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an 
individual juror. 
(1) The panel is a list of jurors called to serve 
at a particular court or for the trial of a particu-
lar action. A challenge to the panel is an objec-
tion made to all jurors summoned and may be 
taken by either party. 
(i) A challenge to the panel can be founded 
only on a material departure from the proce-
dure prescribed with respect to the selection, 
drawing, summoning and return of the 
panel. 
(ii) The challenge to the panel shall be 
taken before the jury is sworn and shall be m 
writing or recorded by the reporter. It shall 
specifically set forth the facts constituting 
the grounds of the challenge. 
(iii) If a challenge to the panel is opposed 
by the adverse party, a hearing may be had 
to try any question of fact upon which the 
challenge is based. The jurors challenged, 
and any other persons, may be called as wit-
nesses at the hearing thereon. 
(iv) The court shall decide the challenge-
If the challenge to the panel is allowed, the 
court shall discharge the jury so far as the 
trial in question is concerned. If a challenge 
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is denied, the court shall direct the selection 
of jurors to proceed. 
(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be 
, either peremptory or for cause. A challenge to an 
individual juror may be made only before the 
jury is sworn to try the action, except the court 
may, for good cause, permit it to be made after 
the juror is sworn but before any of the evidence 
is presented. In challenges for cause the rules 
relating to challenges to a panel and hearings 
thereon shall apply. All challenges for cause 
shall be taken first by the prosecution and then 
by the defense, 
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a ju-
ror for which no reason need be given. In capital 
cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory chal-
lenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled to 
four peremptory challenges. In misdemeanor cases, 
each side is entitled to three peremptory challenges. 
If there is more than one defendant the court may 
jjlow the defendants additional peremptory chal-
lenges and permit them to be exercised separately or 
jointly. 
* (e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a par-
ticular juror and may be taken on one or more of the 
following grounds: 
(1) want of any of the qualifications prescribed 
by law; 
(2) any mental or physical infirmity which 
renders one incapable of performing the duties of 
a juror; 
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the fourth 
degree to the person alleged to be injured by the 
offense charged, or on whose complaint the prose-
cution was instituted; 
(4) the existence of any social, legal, business, 
fiduciary or other relationship between the pro-
spective juror and any party, witness or person 
alleged to have been victimized or injured by the 
defendant, which relationship when viewed ob-
jectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that 
the prospective juror would be unable or unwill-
ing to return a verdict which would be free of 
favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be dis-
qualified solely because he is indebted to or em-
ployed by the state or a political subdivision 
thereof; 
(5) having been or being the party adverse to 
the defendant in a civil action, or having com-
plained against or having been accused by him in 
a criminal prosecution; 
(6) having served on the grand jury which 
found the indictment; 
(7) having served on a trial jury which has 
tried another person for the particular offense 
charged; 
(8) having been one of a jury formally sworn to 
try the same charge, and whose verdict was set 
aside, or which was discharged without a verdict 
after the case was submitted to it; 
(9) having served as a juror in a civil action 
brought against the defendant for the act 
charged as an offense; 
(10) if the offense charged is punishable with 
death, the entertaining of such conscientious 
opinions about the death penalty as would pre-
clude the juror from voting to impose the death 
penalty following conviction regardless of the 
facts; 
(11) because he is or, within one year preced-
ing, has been engaged or interested in carrying 
on any business, calling or employment, the car-
rying on of which is a violation of law, where 
defendant is charged with a like offense; 
(12) because he has been a witness, either for 
or against the defendant on the preliminary ex-
amination or before the grand jury; 
(13) having formed or expressed an unquali-
fied opinion or belief as to whether the defendant 
is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; or 
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part of 
the juror with reference to the cause, or to either 
party, which will prevent him from acting impar-
tially and without prejudice to the substantial 
rights of the party challenging; but no person 
shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of hav-
ing formed or expressed an opinion upon the mat-
ter or cause to be submitted to such jury, founded 
upon public rumor, statements in public journals 
or common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears 
to the court that the juror can and will, notwith-
standing such opinion, act impartially and fairly 
upon the matter to be submitted to him. 
(0 Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by 
the prosecution and then by the defense alternately. 
Challenges for cause shall be completed before pe-
remptory challenges are taken. 
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be 
impanelled. Alternate jurors, in the order in which 
they are called, shall replace jurors who are, or be-
come, unable or disqualified to perform their duties. 
The prosecution and defense shall each have one ad-
ditional peremptory challenge for each alternate ju-
ror to be chosen. 
Alternate jurors shall have the same qualifications, 
take the same oath and enjoy the same privileges as 
regular jurors. 
(h) A statutory exemption from service as a juror is 
a privilege of the person exempted and is not a 
ground for challenge for cause. 
(i) When the jury is selected an oath shall be ad-
ministered to the jurors, in substance, that they and 
each of them will well and truly try the matter in 
issue between the parties, and render a true verdict 
according to the evidence and the instructions of the 
court. 
Rule 19. Instructions. 
(a) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier 
time as the court reasonably directs, any party may 
file written request that the court instruct the jury on 
the law as set forth in the request. At the same time 
copies of such requests shall be furnished to the other 
parties. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed 
action upon the request; and it shall furnish counsel 
with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the 
parties stipulate that such instructions may be given 
orally, or otherwise waive this requirement. 
(b) Upon each written request so presented and 
given, or refused, the court shall endorse its decision 
and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and part 
refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by the 
endorsement what part of the charge was given and 
what part was refused. 
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the 
charge or omission therefrom unless he objects 
thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly 
the matter to which he objects and the ground of his 
objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, 
error may be assigned to instructions in order to 
avoid a manifest injustice. 
(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence in 
the case, and if the court refers to any of the evidence, 
